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I. KEYWORD ADVERTISING—USE IN COMMERCE: RESCUECOM
The Second Circuit’s opinion in Rescuecom Corp. v. Google, Inc.1
may be one of the most important opinions in recent years.  Its subject—
keyword advertising—has generated a large number of reported 
opinions, both in the United States and abroad.2  “Keyword advertising” 
refers to the practice (most often associated with Google) of the sale by a 
search engine of key words, whose entry into the search engine produces 
advertisements on behalf of the purchasers of the key words along with 
the results of the search.3  When the advertisements are the result of a 
search using a trademarked word or phrase, the trademark owner 
frequently complains that users may be confused as to possible 
* Professor of Law, Whittier Law School.  © 2010 by David S. Welkowitz. 
 1. Rescuecom Corp. v. Google Inc., 562 F.3d 123 (2d Cir. 2009). 
 2. One such case has reached the European Court of Justice.  See Case C-236/08, Google 
France S.A.R.L. v. Louis Vuitton Malletier, [2010] E.T.M.R. 30 (ECJ 2010). 
 3. In the case of Google, keyword advertising is often manifested in the form of “sponsored 
links” (labeled as such) which appear above and to the side of the actual search results, often on a 
different colored background than the search results.  See Rescuecom, 562 F.3d at 126. 
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connections between the trademark owner and the advertiser.4
Trademark owners also contend that it is unfair for Google to use their 
brand identity to obtain advertising revenues from competitors of the 
trademark owners.5  Keyword advertising raises numerous issues, not 
the least of which is whether users are likely to be confused about the 
sources or affiliation of the sponsored links.6  However, many cases, 
especially in the Second Circuit, became enmeshed in a preliminary 
issue—whether the sale of trademarked keywords, which do not appear 
in the sponsored advertisements, constitutes a “use in commerce” of the 
trademarks, as that phrase is defined in section 45 of the Lanham Act.7
That was the issue before the court in Rescuecom.8  In a previous 
decision, 1-800 Contacts, Inc. v. WhenU.Com, Inc.,9 the court held that 
software that generated pop-up advertisements in response to the entry 
of various web addresses (including ones containing trademarks) 
contained in the software’s database did not constitute a use in 
commerce.10  Following 1-800 Contacts, district courts in the Second 
Circuit held that keyword advertising also did not constitute a use in 
commerce because the mark was not affixed on a product or displayed 
with a product or service.11  In Rescuecom, the Second Circuit 
distinguished its 1-800 Contacts opinion and held that the sale of 
 4. For a general discussion of this subject, see Kristen M. Beystehner, See Ya Later, Gator: 
Assessing Whether Placing Pop-Up Advertisements On Another Company’s Website Violates 
Trademark Law, 11 J. INTELL. PROP. L. 87 (2003). 
 5. See id. at 93-95. 
 6. See id. at 107.  Rescuecom, 562 F.3d at 126-31. 
 7. The Lanham Act definition is as follows: 
The term “use in commerce” means the bona fide use of a mark in the ordinary course of 
trade, and not made merely to reserve a right in a mark. For purposes of this chapter, a 
mark shall be deemed to be in use in commerce— 
(1) on goods when— 
(A) it is placed in any manner on the goods or their containers or the displays associated 
therewith or on the tags or labels affixed thereto, or if the nature of the goods makes such 
placement impracticable, then on documents associated with the goods or their sale, and 
(B) the goods are sold or transported in commerce, and 
(2) on services when it is used or displayed in the sale or advertising of services and the 
services are rendered in commerce, or the services are rendered in more than one State or 
in the United States and a foreign country and the person rendering the services is 
engaged in commerce in connection with the services. 
15 U.S.C. § 1127 (2010). 
 8. Rescuecom Corp., 562 F.3d at 125, 129. 
 9. 1-800 Contacts, Inc. v. WhenU.com, Inc., 414 F.3d 400 (2d Cir. 2005). 
 10. Id. at 412. 
 11. See, e.g., Merck & Co., Inc. v. Mediplan Health Consulting, Inc., 425 F. Supp. 2d. 402, 
415 (S.D.N.Y. 2006).  But see J.G. Wentworth, S.S.C. Ltd. v. Settlement Funding LLC, Inc., No. 
06-0597, 2007 WL 30115, at *5 (E.D. Pa. Jan. 4, 2007) (declining to follow the Second Circuit 
cases in a Third Circuit District Court decision). 
2
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keywords by Google does constitute a use in commerce.12  The court 
gave two alternative reasons for the distinction.13  First, in 1-800 
Contacts, the trigger for the pop-up ad was a website address, not a 
trademark—although a domain name may contain a trademark—and the 
plaintiff’s trademark never appeared in the pop-up ad.14  Second, the 
defendant in 1-800 Contacts did not actually sell the trademark to the 
advertiser.15  The software contained a collection of advertisements that 
were shown whenever the software deemed them appropriate to the 
entered term.16  The advertiser had no control over the timing of the 
advertising.17  Because Google actually sold the use of the trademark for 
advertising purposes to an advertiser (or many advertisers), the court 
held that Google satisfied the definition by “using” the mark “in the sale 
. . . of [Google’s] services.”18  Finally, the court rejected the argument 
that a use in commerce requires a use that is displayed to the public—a 
trademark use.19  That Google’s actions constitute a “use in commerce” 
does not, of course, mean that it is an infringer.  The trademark owner 
still must demonstrate that consumers are likely to believe that the 
sponsored links are somehow connected with the trademark owner.20
However, the most important part of the opinion was not the 
decision itself, or its reasoning.  Rather, it was the Appendix that the 
court annexed to its opinion that made the decision extraordinary.21  As 
law students, we are all taught that federal courts will not issue advisory 
opinions.  But it is difficult to view the Rescuecom Appendix as 
anything other than an advisory opinion.22  And its breadth is rather 
sweeping.  The court embarked on a fairly lengthy discussion of the 
history and purpose of the “use in commerce” definition.  It concluded 
that it probably was not intended to apply at all to infringement cases—
only to registration.23  The court’s reasoning is not at all illogical.  The 
concept of affixation (or simultaneous display) that underlies the 
definition has long been connected with the idea of “use” necessary to 
 12. Rescuecom, 562 F.3d at 127-29. 
 13. Id.
 14. Id. at 128. 
 15. Id. at 128-29. 
 16. Id. at 129. 
 17. Id. at 128-29. 
 18. Id. at 129. 
 19. Id.
 20. See id. at 130-31. 
 21. Id.
 22. See id. at 131-41. 
 23.  Id. at 132-34. 
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create trademark rights.24  And, once there is sufficient connection 
between interstate commerce and the trademark, the jurisdictional nexus 
for Congressional regulation seems satisfied.25  Indeed, there is a tension 
between the definition of “use in commerce” and the definition of 
“commerce.”  The latter refers to all commerce that can be regulated by 
Congress,26 but the former limits the scope to something less than the 
outer boundaries of Congressional power.27  Nevertheless, as the court 
admits, the definition of use in commerce is not by its terms limited to 
registration.28  Thus, the court’s analytical approach (which included a 
discussion of the legislative history of the provision) differs from the 
literalist, text-only approach used recently by many courts, including the 
Supreme Court.29   
In addition to appending this advisory opinion, the panel, as 
revealed in the Appendix, took the additional unusual step of polling the 
members of the panel that decided 1-800 Contacts to obtain their views 
of the Appendix.30  According to the court, the 1-800 Contacts panel 
concurred in the views expressed in the Appendix.31  This informal 
polling permitted the panel to create a kind of unofficial, mini-en banc 
opinion without the formalities of an en banc request or hearing. 
Of course, the Appendix is still dicta; in the main opinion the court 
distinguished 1-800 Contacts and rested its decision on that distinction.32
On the other hand, given the depth and breadth of the discussion, it is 
hard to believe that the court did not intend the Appendix to have 
influence, which undoubtedly it will have, especially with district judges 
in the Second Circuit. 
The Internet is, obviously, an international vehicle.  Thus, it is 
useful to compare Rescuecom with a recent keyword advertising 
decision of the European Court of Justice (ECJ).33  As in the United 
States, trademark owners assert that keyword advertising constitutes an 
 24. See id. at 134. 
 25. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3. 
 26. 15 U.S.C. § 1127 (2010) (defining “commerce” as follows:  “The word ‘commerce’ 
means all commerce which may lawfully be regulated by Congress”). 
 27. 15 U.S.C. § 1127 (2010) (defining use in commerce for a mark in the Lanham Act, § 43). 
 28. Rescuecom, 562 F.3d at 132. 
 29. E.g., Moseley v. V Secret Catalogue, Inc., 537 U.S. 418, 432-33 (2003) (including a plain 
language reading of federal dilution statute).  The Rescuecom court urged Congress to consider the 
issue.  Rescuecom, 562 F.3d at 140-41. 
30. Rescuecom, 562 F.3d at 140. 
 31. Id.
 32. Id. at 128-29. 
 33. Case C-236/08, Google Fr. S.A.R.L. v. Louis Vuitton Malletier, [2010] E.T.M.R. 30 (ECJ 
2010). 
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infringing use of their marks.34  Also as in the United States, there is an 
issue about whether sales of keywords constitute a “use” of the marks.35
In contrast to the United States, the key phrase is “use in the course of 
trade,” rather than “use in commerce,” and the phrase is subject to court 
interpretation, rather than statutory definition.36  In this case, the ECJ 
decided that, although the sale of keywords was “in the course of trade” 
for Google, it did not constitute a “use”—a use would have to be “in its 
own commercial communication.”37  Thus, allowing the advertiser to use 
the mark (and the court did hold that the advertiser had used the mark in 
the course of trade) was not the same as using it for oneself.38  This is 
not precisely the “trademark” use that was at issue in Rescuecom, but it 
has some similarities.  Contrary to the trend in the United States, the ECJ 
found no actionable “use.”39
II. DILUTION: STARBUCKS
Another case afforded the Second Circuit an opportunity to 
interpret the relatively new and relatively under-interpreted Trademark 
Dilution Revision Act of 2006 (TDRA).40  That case, Starbucks Corp. v. 
Wolfe’s Borough Coffee, Inc.,41 was before the court of appeals for the 
second time.  The first time, following the district court’s rejection of 
Starbucks’ claims, the court of appeals remanded so that the district 
court could determine the effect of the TDRA on the dilution claims.42
Then, after the district court rejected the dilution claims a second time, 
the case was back in the court of appeals.43
The TDRA made several important changes to the original Federal 
Trademark Dilution Act (FTDA).44  The most publicized was the change 
 34. See id.
 35. Id. ¶¶ 50-59.
 36. Id. ¶¶ 50-59.
 37. Id. ¶ 56. 
 38. Id. ¶ 104. 
 39. This does not mean that Google was free of problems.  The ECJ held that the advertiser 
might be held liable for infringement under a provision that precludes unauthorized use of an 
identical mark on identical goods.  See id. ¶87.  The ECJ left it up to the national courts to decide 
whether a reasonable Internet user would have difficulty understanding that the advertiser was 
unrelated to the mark owner.  Id. ¶88.  If the advertiser were held liable, Google’s business model 
would be in jeopardy.  Rescuecom Corp. v. Google Inc., 562 F.3d 123, 126 (2d Cir. 2009). 
 40. 15 U.S.C. § 1051 (2010). 
 41. 588 F.3d 97 (2d Cir. 2009). 
 42. Id. at 104. 
 43. Starbucks also challenged the district court’s rejection of its infringement claims.  Id. at 
104-05. 
 44. 15 U.S.C. § 1051 (2002). 
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that overruled the Supreme Court’s ruling that the FTDA required a 
plaintiff to show “actual” dilution, not just a likelihood of dilution.45  But 
the TDRA also revamped the basic definition of dilution, dividing it into 
two categories—blurring and tarnishment—each with its own 
definition.46  Blurring received further statutory embellishment; in 
addition to the definition, the drafters provided six non-exclusive factors 
for courts to consider when analyzing claims of likelihood of dilution by 
blurring.47 Starbucks, where the defendant coffee seller called some of 
its brews “Charbucks” and “Mister Charbucks,” invoked the new 
definition.48  The district court, applying the common precedent from the 
Second Circuit and other circuits, held that a plaintiff must show that the 
accused mark is “substantially similar” to the famous mark.49  The court 
of appeals, however, held that the TDRA altered that requirement, 
making the degree of similarity one factor, but not requiring a particular 
degree of similarity.50  Obviously, if the two marks are not very similar, 
the association between the two marks that is necessary for dilution will 
not occur.  However, under Starbucks, a court may consider varying 
degrees of similarity in a blurring analysis.51  Prior to Starbucks,
“substantial similarity” (or its equivalent) acted as a threshold 
requirement, causing many dilution claims to fail.52  After Starbucks
similarity becomes just one of several factors in the dilution analysis.53
This may make it easier to prove likelihood of dilution in some cases.  
The court of appeals also found error in the district court’s evaluation of 
the fifth and sixth factors, the intent to create an association and the 
existence of actual association.54  As to the former, the district court 
 45. Moseley v. V Secret Catalogue, Inc., 537 U.S. 418 (2003).  The FTDA gave a cause of 
action against a use that “causes dilution.”  The TDRA gives a cause of action against a use that “is 
likely to cause dilution.”  15 U.S.C. § 1125(c)(1) (2006). 
 46. Lanham Act § 43(c)(2)(B), (C), 15 U.S.C. § 1125(c)(2)(B), (C). 
 47. Lanham Act § 43(c)(2)(B)(i)-(vi); 15 U.S.C. § 1125(c)(2)(B)(i)-(vi). 
 48. Starbucks Corp. v. Wolfe’s Borough Coffee, Inc., 588 F.3d 97, 103 (2d Cir. 2009). 
 49. Id. at 107. The Ninth Circuit recently reaffirmed its standard, which requires that marks be 
“identical or nearly identical.”  E! Entm’t Television, Inc. v. Entm’t One GP Ltd., 363 F. App’x 510 
(9th Cir. 2010) (unpublished opinion).  Only famous marks are eligible for protection under the 
federal statute.  15 U.S.C. § 1125(c)(1). 
 50. Starbucks, 588 F.3d at 108-09.  The first factor listed in the statute is “[t]he degree of 
similarity between the mark or trade name and the famous mark.”  15 U.S.C. § 1125(c)(2)(B)(i). 
 51. Starbucks, 588 F.3d at 106. 
 52. See, e.g., CareFirst of Md. v. First Care, P.C., 434 F.3d 263, 274 (4th Cir. 2006); 
Autozone, Inc. v. Tandy Corp., 373 F.3d 786, 806-07 (6th Cir. 2004); Playtex Prods., Inc. v. Ga. 
Pac. Corp., 390 F.3d 158, 167 (2d Cir. 2004). 
 53. Starbucks, 588 F.3d at 106-07. 
 54. Id. at 109. 
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favored the defendant because of a lack of bad faith.55  The court of 
appeals rejected any requirement of bad faith; intent to create association 
meant that this factor favored a finding of dilution.56  As to evidence of 
association, the court of appeals ruled that the district court improperly 
conflated lack of evidence of confusion with lack of association.57   In 
light of the lower court’s mistakes, the Second Circuit remanded for yet 
another consideration of the blurring claim.58  On the other hand, the 
court of appeals upheld the district court’s rejection of a dilution by 
tarnishment claim and its rejection of the infringement (confusion) 
claim.59
The court of appeals’ analysis of similarity is perfectly compatible 
with the language of the TDRA.60  As the court states, the statute 
contains no special requirements concerning the requisite degree of 
similarity.61  And the notion expressed by the court that consumers 
would be more likely to make an association when the marks are on 
competing goods is logical.62  In other ways, however, the court’s 
analysis is imperfect.  For one thing, its comparison to state dilution 
laws, where the Second Circuit has long imposed a “substantial 
similarity” requirement, was simply wrong.63  The court stated that 
dilution under state laws was “better defined” than under the original 
FTDA.64  New York’s law, the analysis of which led to the “substantial 
similarity” requirement, contains no definition of dilution.65  Until very 
recently, other state laws either looked like New York’s law or they 
looked like the original FTDA.66  Moreover, the requirement of 
“substantial similarity” reflected two limitations of dilution.  First, for 
consumers to make a sufficient association between the two (usually 




 58. Id. at 109-10. 
 59. Id. at 110-11.  The court also upheld the rejection of a dilution claim under New York’s 
dilution statute.  Id. at 114. 
 60. Id. at 105-11.  15 U.S.C. § 1125. 
 61. Starbucks, 588 F.3d at 108-09. 
 62. Id. at 118 (referring to “products of equal quality”). 
 63. See id. at 108. 
 64. Id. at 108. 
 65. See N.Y. GEN BUS LAW § 360 (McKinney 1996). 
 66. See DAVID S. WELKOWITZ, TRADEMARK DILUTION: FEDERAL, STATE, AND 
INTERNATIONAL LAW 17-21 (BNA Books 2002); 2009 Cum. Supp. ch. 1, § III.A.3. (BNA Books 
2009). 
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be a very strong similarity between them.67  Otherwise, the association 
either will be too fleeting or too weak to have a diluting impact.68
Second, the requirement served as a useful check on the somewhat 
limitless and standardless power of a dilution claim.69  Although the 
TDRA was intended to broaden the operative language of the statute, 
there is little evidence that Congress intended to create a dramatically 
broader claim than had existed under state law; indeed, the narrowing of 
the definition of fame, and the circumscription of dilution by factors, 
points in the opposite direction.70
It will be interesting to see the reaction of other circuits, especially 
the Ninth Circuit, to the Starbucks analysis.  The Ninth Circuit has long 
required that the two marks be “identical or nearly identical” in order to 
support a dilution claim.71  As the Starbucks court noted, the Ninth 
Circuit has not formally addressed this requirement since the TDRA.72
III. DILUTION—COMPARATIVE ADVERTISING?INTERNATIONAL 
DEVELOPMENTS—EUROPEAN UNION: L’OREAL V. BELLURE
In a globalized world, no trademark lawyer can ignore 
developments in trademark law around the world.  The European Union 
has a unified system of trademark protection, the Community Trade 
Mark (CTM),73 which gives protection throughout the European Union, 
and a second system of national trademark laws, in which member 
countries have harmonized their laws according to a European Union 
Directive,74 to make them relatively similar in many critical aspects.  
Both systems share certain core characteristics.  Like the United States 
system, the primary basis of trademark infringement in the European 
 67. Starbucks, 588 F.3d at 107-108. 
 68. Moseley v. V Secret Catalogue, Inc., 537 U.S. 418, 433 (2003). 
 69. Starbucks, 588 F.3d at 107-108. 
 70. See 15 U.S.C. § 1125(c) (2010). 
 71. Thane Int’l, Inc. v. Trek Bicycle Corp., 305 F.3d 894, 907 (9th Cir. 2002). 
 72. The Ninth Circuit’s standard was followed by a district court post-TDRA.  Century 21 
Real Estate LLC v. Century Ins. Grp., No. CIV 03-0053-PHX-SMM, 2007 WL 484555, at *14-15 
(D. Ariz. Feb. 9, 2007), aff’d, 300 F. App’x 527 (9th Cir. 2008).  Moreover, after Starbucks the 
Ninth Circuit did reiterate its previous standard in an unpublished opinion.  E! Entm’t Television, 
Inc. v. Entm’t One GP Ltd., 363 F. App’x 510 (9th Cir. 2010) (unpublished opinion). 
 73. Council Regulation (EC) No 207/2009 of 26 February 2009 on the Community trade 
mark, superseding Council Regulation (EC) No. 40/94 of 20 December 1993 on the Community 
trade mark (“CTM Regulations”). 
 74. First Directive 89/104/EEC of the Council, of 21 December 1988, to Approximate the 
Laws of the Member States Relating to Trade Marks (OJ EC No L 40 of 11.2.1989, p. 1), 
superseded by Council Directive 2008/95/EC of 22 October 2008 to Approximate the Laws of the 
Member States Relating to Trade Marks (OJ 2008 L 299 p.25). 
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Union is confusion.75  Also like the United States system, the European 
Union trademark laws, both the CTM and the harmonized system, 
contain a dilution provision.76  The key language of both dilution 
provisions in the European Union is the same.77  In the past few years, 
the ECJ has issued several opinions interpreting the dilution statute, 
notably a 2008 decision, Intel Corp. v. CPM United Kingdom Ltd.78  In 
2009, the ECJ issued its latest interpretation, L’Oreal S.A. v. Bellure, 
NV,79 an opinion that illustrates some critical differences between the 
philosophy and application of United States trademark law and that of 
the European Union. 
European Union dilution law, while containing some elements that 
are similar to United States dilution law, is worded quite differently from 
federal or state laws in this country.80  Here is the relevant portion of the 
CTM Regulations: 
The proprietor [of a CTM] shall be entitled to prevent all third parties 
not having his consent from using in the course of trade: 
(c) any sign which is identical with, or similar to, the Community trade 
mark in relation to goods or services which are not similar to those for 
which the Community trade mark is registered, where the latter has a 
reputation in the Community and where use of that sign without due 
cause takes unfair advantage of, or is detrimental to, the distinctive 
character or the repute of the Community trade mark.81
Earlier ECJ decisions had given guidance on the meaning of a 
“mark with a reputation,”82 and “detrimental to the distinctive character 
or repute of the trade mark.”83  But the concept of “taking unfair 
advantage” remained relatively unexplained by the ECJ until the 
L’Oreal decision.84  The Intel decision established that dilution requires 
 75. See Council Directive 89/104, Art. 4(4(a)), 5(2); 15 U.S.C. § 1125(c) (2010).  See also
Marcus H.H. Leupke, Taking Unfair Advantage or Diluting A Famous Mark:  A 20/20 Perspective 
On The Blurred Differences Between U.S. and E.U. Dilution Law, 98 TRADEMARK REP. 789 (May-
June 2008). 
 76. Id. at 806. 
 77. See Leupke, 98 TRADEMARK REP. 789; Council Regulation (EC) No 207/2009, Art. 9; 
First Directive 89/104/EEC of the Council, Art. 5. 
 78. Case C-252/07 Intel Corp. v. CPM U.K. Ltd., 2008 ECR I-8823. 
 79. Case C-487/07 L’Oreal S.A. v. Bellure, NV, [2009] E.T.M.R. 55 (ECJ 2009). 
 80. Council Regulation (EC) No 207/2009, Art. 9(1)(c). 
 81. Id.  The Trademark Harmonization Directive contains an almost identical provision in 
Article 5(2). 
 82. E.g., Case C-375/97, Gen. Motors Corp. v. Yplon, S.A., 1999 E.C.R. I-542. 
 83. Case C-487/07 L’Oreal S.A. v. Bellure, NV, [2009] E.T.M.R. 55, ¶¶ 39-40. 
 84. Id. ¶¶ 41-45. 
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a link between the two marks due to their similarity,85 and, in addition, 
there must be proof that there will be a detriment to the distinctiveness 
of the mark or unfair advantage taken of its reputation.86 Intel discussed 
the factors that would lead to a finding of a detriment,87 but only 
obliquely discussed “unfair advantage” in the context of factors that do 
not necessarily mean either unfair advantage of or detriment to the 
mark.88
L’Oreal’s facts probably would not have even provoked a lawsuit 
in the United States.  It was, for all intents and purposes, a comparative 
advertising case.89  Bellure, along with the other defendants, is a maker 
of perfumes that imitate the fragrances of well-known perfumes, 
including several made by L’Oreal.90  Some of those perfumes were 
packaged in ways that are similar to the well-known brands, but not in 
ways that would cause confusion, tarnishment, or dilution by blurring.91
The imitations were marketed with comparison lists, showing which 
imitations corresponded to various brands, and in packaging that was 
similar to that used by L’Oreal, but not so similar as to cause 
confusion.92  L’Oreal sued, claiming that the packaging violated Article 
5(2) of the Trademark Harmonization Directive (essentially the same as 
Article 9(1)(c) of the CTM Regulations), and that the list violated 
another provision of the Trademark Harmonization Directive (by using 
an identical trademark on identical goods) and a provision of the 
comparative advertising directive that prohibits taking unfair advantage 
of the mark.93  In the United States, such comparative advertising has 
long been considered outside the scope of trademark protection, unless 
the advertiser gives false information about one or both products.94  The 
federal dilution statute contains a specific exclusion for comparative 
advertising.95  But European Union trademark laws contain no such 
 85. Id. ¶¶ 30-31; see also id. ¶¶ 42, 64 (discussing factors). 
 86. Id. ¶ 68. 
 87. Id. ¶¶ 68-81. 
 88. Id. ¶ 80. 
 89. Case C-487/07 L’Oreal S.A. v. Bellure, NV, [2009] E.T.M.R. 55, ¶¶ 14-27.  Technically, 
L’Oreal interpreted the Trademark Harmonization Directive, not the CTM Regulations, but the 
principles involved do not differ. 
 90. Id. ¶¶ 14-21. 
 91. Id. ¶¶ 14-41, 30. 
 92. Id. ¶¶ 17-19, 21, 29. 
 93. Id. ¶¶ 22-24. 
 94. Smith v. Chanel, Inc., 402 F.2d 562 (9th Cir. 1968). 
 95. Lanham Act § 43(c)(3)(A)(i); 15 U.S.C. § 1125(c)(3)(A)(i) (excluding “fair use” in 
connection with comparative advertising from dilution liability). 
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specific exclusion, and L’Oreal claimed that Bellure was taking “unfair 
advantage” of L’Oreal’s trademark.96  The ECJ agreed.97
As to Article 5(2), the ECJ made clear that taking “unfair 
advantage” is an independent wrong that does not depend on showing 
any other form of dilution or confusion.98  The court is to make “a global 
assessment” of the facts to determine whether the second user is “free 
riding” on the reputation of the well-known mark.99  Further, the ECJ 
indicated sua sponte that this aspect of Article 5(2) applied to the 
comparison lists.100  Finally, the ECJ held that using the well-known 
mark to market an imitation, even by a truthful comparison, violated the 
comparative advertising directive and took “unfair advantage” of the 
mark.101
The trend of European Union law has been somewhat more 
protective of trademarks than United States law, especially with regard 
to non-confusing uses.102  Thus, the ECJ has ruled that the maker of an 
unauthorized soccer team scarf was infringing, despite a clear disclaimer 
of any connection with, or authorization from, the soccer team.103  It 
later ruled that the dilution law applied to competing goods situations, 
despite the statutory language limiting dilution claims to situations 
where the goods are “not similar.”104  The phrase “mark with a 
reputation” encompasses a far larger universe of marks than does the 
category of “famous” marks under United States law.105  The somewhat 
holistic approach of the ECJ in Intel and L’Oreal is more amorphous 
than the six-factor test set out in the TDRA.106  And L’Oreal permits a 
 96. Case C-487/07 L’Oreal S.A. v. Bellure, NV, [2009] E.T.M.R. 55, ¶¶ 22-30, 60. 
 97. Id. ¶¶ 59, 80.  The ECJ’s ruling fairly clearly meant that defendants’ actions violated the 
comparative advertising laws.  As to dilution, the ECJ’s ruling meant that there could be a violation 
on the facts, but the court left it to the member country’s courts (in this case, the U.K.) to make that 
determination, following the guidelines set by the ECJ. 
 98. Id. ¶¶ 41-43. 
 99. Id. ¶¶ 44, 50. 
 100. Id. ¶¶ 62-64. 
 101. Id. ¶ 80. 
 102. See Case C-487/07 L’Oreal S.A. v. Bellure, NV, [2009] E.T.M.R. 55, ¶ 80. 
 103. Case C-206/01 Arsenal Football Club, Plc. v. Reed, 2002 E.C.R. I-10273, ¶ 62 
(interpreting Article 5(1)(a)). 
 104. Case C-408/01  Adidas-Salomon, A.G. v. Fitnessworld Trading, Ltd., 2003 E.C.R. I-
12537, ¶¶ 19-22. 
 105. Compare Case C-375/97 Gen. Motors Corp. v. Yplon, 1999 E.C.R. I-5421, ¶¶ 20-28 
(mark must “be known by a significant part of the public concerned in a substantial part of [a 
member country]” (emphasis added)), with 15 U.S.C. § 1125(c)(2)(A) (stating famous mark must be 
“widely recognized by the general consuming public of the United States” (emphasis added)). 
 106. Admittedly, the TDRA’s test does not lead to conclusive results either.  But one doubts 
that the ECJ would have denied a dilution claim under the circumstances presented in Louis Vuitton 
11
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claim in situations clearly not covered by United States law.107  Those 
whose clients serve markets in Europe and count on directly transferring 
their knowledge of United States law to European law do so at their 
peril. 
IV. REGISTRATION—FRAUD ON THE PTO: BOSE
Registered trademarks are valuable assets, especially in a world 
where foreign registrations may be linked to a domestic registration 
through the Madrid Protocol.108  An unexpected loss of registration 
could seriously disrupt a trademark owner’s ability to protect its 
trademark.109  On the other hand, we do not wish to issue valuable assets 
on the basis of fraudulent representations.  Thus, those who obtain 
registrations by defrauding the PTO will have them canceled when the 
fraud is brought to the attention of the PTO.110  The central question is:  
What constitutes “fraud”?  This was the subject of a Federal Circuit 
opinion, In re Bose Corp.111
Six years before Bose, in Medinol v. Neuro Vasx, Inc.,112 the 
Trademark Trial and Appeal Board (TTAB) ruled that fraud could be 
made out by showing:  (1) that the registrant made a false statement; and 
(2) that the registrant knew or should have known that the statement was 
false.113  Moreover, the entire registration could be canceled even if the 
false statement only related to part of the goods or services for which it 
was registered—e.g., a false claim that it was being used on some goods 
Malletier, S.A. v. Haute Diggity Dog, LLC, 507 F.3d 252, 268-69 (4th Cir. 2007) (holding “Chewy 
Vuiton” dog toy does not dilute “Louis Vuitton” mark). 
 107. See Case C-487/07 L’Oreal, E.T.M.R. 55 (ECJ 2009). 
 108. See 15 U.S.C. § 1141c (requiring notification of the International Bureau if a basic 
registration used for an international registration is canceled within five years of issuance or if 
action to cancel began within five years of issuance); id. § 1141j (holding that extension of 
protection is to be canceled if underlying international registration is canceled). 
 109. Domestically, registration constitutes prima facie evidence of one’s exclusive right to use 
the mark on the goods for which it is registered; after five years the presumption becomes 
conclusive.  15 U.S.C. § 1115(a), (b).  Internationally, marks whose extension of protection in other 
countries is based on a U.S. registration may be canceled; the trademark owner would then have 
three months to reapply for registration in those countries based on its original priority.  See 15 
U.S.C. § 1141j(c) (stating that a person whose extension of protection is canceled may apply for 
registration and assert original priority if application is made within three months of international 
registration cancellation).  There is also a provision in the Lanham Act for imposing civil liability 
on one that procures a fraudulent registration in an action brought by an injured party.  15 U.S.C. § 
1120. 
 110. See 15 U.S.C. § 1115(b)(1) (2010). 
 111. 580 F.3d 1240 (Fed. Cir. 2009). 
 112. 67 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1205, 1209 (TTAB 2003). 
 113. Id. at 1208. 
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when the mark was actually being used on other goods.114  Thus, a 
negligently false statement, made without any fraudulent intent could be 
the basis of cancellation.115  Obviously, this is a potential weapon (or 
shield) for others wishing to use the mark and to block an infringement 
suit.116  In Bose, the false statement occurred in a renewal application.117
The application stated that the mark was being used on a class of goods 
that the company no longer sold.118  However, the company’s general 
counsel believed that the mark was still being “used” in that class 
because the company still repaired those goods.119  The PTO found that 
repair did not constitute use.120  More importantly, the TTAB ruled that 
the belief that repair constituted use was unreasonable—that is, Bose 
should have known it was not proper—and therefore fraudulent.121  The 
Federal Circuit reversed, holding that some evidence of intent to deceive 
was required to show fraud on the PTO; negligence (including an 
unreasonable belief in the truth of the statement) was not sufficient.122
Left undecided in Bose was whether a reckless disregard for the 
truth would constitute fraudulent intent.123  In dicta in a post-Bose
decision, the TTAB obliquely indicated that it would be sufficient.124
However, in Bose, the Federal Circuit stated that even gross negligence 
would not demonstrate fraudulent intent.125  Thus, if reckless disregard is 
 114. See Medinol, 67 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1205 (holding PTO canceled the mark in its 
entirety). 
 115. Subsequent TTAB decisions somewhat ameliorated the Medinol rule.  See, e.g., Maids to 
Order of Ohio, Inc. v. Maid-to-Order Inc., 78 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1899, 1905 (TTAB 2006) (holding 
honest and reasonable belief in truth of statement found sufficient to preclude fraud); Univ. Games 
Corp. v. 20Q.net, Inc., 87 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1465, 1468 (TTAB 2008) (holding correction of false 
statement during prosecution creates rebuttable presumption of no fraudulent intent); Zanella v. 
Nordstrom, Inc., 90 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1758, 1761-62 (TTAB 2008) (holding in dicta that 
correction of false statement prior to any challenge to registration creates rebuttable presumption of 
no fraudulent intent). 
 116. Common law trademark rights by use certainly would exist.  But, where priority is based 
on constructive use, which is dependent on registration, see 15 U.S.C. § 1057(c), the loss of 
registration would preclude priority. 
 117. In re Bose Corp., 580 F.3d 1240, 1242 (Fed. Cir. 2009). 
 118. Id.
 119. Id.
 120. Id. at 1246. 
 121. Id. at 1246-47. 
 122. Id. at 1244-45. 
 123. Id. at 1246 n.2. 
 124. DaimlerChrysler Corp. v. American Motors Corp., Cancellation No. 92045099, 2010 WL 
302022, at *10 (Jan. 14, 2010).  In a footnote, the TTAB acknowledged that the Federal Circuit left 
this issue open.  Id. at *6 n.5. 
 125. Bose, 476 F.3d at 1244, citing Kingsdown Med. Consultants, Ltd. v. Hollister, Inc., 935 
F.2d 867, 876 (Fed. Cir. 1988). 
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sufficient, it must rise to a level above gross negligence, leaving a small 
window of less than full subjective intent for an opponent to climb 
through.126
A separate question is whether Bose is good policy.  It has already 
been criticized on the grounds that it adopts an inapt patent standard, and 
that mistakes, especially in specifying uses, are uniquely within the 
registrant’s control, justifying a different standard.127  This critique 
views Bose as a disincentive for the applicant to be careful or for an 
opponent to even raise the issue of fraud.128  On the other hand, it seems 
harsh for a registrant to be entirely deprived of a registration for an error 
that does not reflect bad faith and that only affects part of the 
registration.129  Perhaps the Federal Circuit would prefer that Congress 
make the policy decision about where to draw the line if the Bose
standard proves problematic. 
The TTAB’s Medinol rule, and the Federal Circuit’s reversal, may 
be seen in the larger context of the agency attempting to create easily 
applied, administratively convenient rules and the court requiring harder 
to apply, but less harsh standards.130  A rule that only requires showing 
objectively unreasonable behavior is easier to administer than a standard 
requiring evidence of intent to deceive.  Thus, it is not surprising that an 
administrative agency would seek to apply the harsher, but less 
complicated, “should have known” standard.131  This certainly is not the 
first time that the PTO has tried to apply a relatively bright-line rule, 
only to be rebuked by a higher court.  In In re Nantucket,132 the Federal 
Circuit’s predecessor, the Court of Customs and Patent Appeals 
(CCPA), reversed the TTAB’s rule regarding geographically deceptively 
misdescriptive marks.133 The TTAB’s rule was that if a mark represented 
a geographic place, and if that place was not the origin of the goods, the 
 126. See Bose, 476 F.3d at 1244-45. 
 127. See Brandon L. Harrell, Note, Federal Circuit Tightens Standard For Proving Intent To 
Deceive in Trademark Fraud Cases: In re Bose Corp., 12 TUL. J. TECH. & INTELL. PROP. 313 
(2009). 
 128. See, e.g., Joseph Dreitler, The Dangers Posed by Bose, WORLD TRADEMARK REVIEW,
Dec./Jan. 2010, at 13. 
 129. The Maids to Order case may reflect the TTAB’s effort to draw a more palatable line.  
See Maids to Order of Ohio, Inc. v. Maid-to-Order Inc., 78 U.S.P.Q.2d 1899, 1905 (TTAB 2006). 
 130. Medinol Ltd. v. Neuro Vasx Inc., 67 U.S.P.Q.2d 1205, 1205, 1209 (TTAB 2003). 
 131. See, e.g., Brief for Petitioner at 19-22, Shen Mfg. Co., Inc. v. Ritz Hotel Ltd., 546 U.S. 
822 (2005) (No. 04-1648), 2005 WL 1361867. 
 132. 677 F.2d 95 (CCPA 1982). 
 133. At the time, such marks could only be registered on a showing of secondary meaning; 
now they are barred from registration altogether.  Lanham Act § 2(e)(3), (f), 15 U.S.C. § 1052(e)(3), 
(f). 
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mark could not be registered.134  The CCPA, however, held that this 
rule—simple to apply—ignored the requirement of deceptiveness.135
Thus, it required the PTO to show that the public would expect the 
goods to come from that place, and were thus deceived by the false 
implication.136  Clearly, the CCPA’s standard is more difficult to 
administer than the TTAB’s rule.137 Bose, then, may be seen as part of a 
continuing struggle to define the proper boundary between appropriate 
administrative discretion to create rules and an improper reading of the 
statute in furtherance of unwarranted administrative convenience. 
A post-Bose example of this same problem is In re Sones.138  The 
PTO rejected a specimen of use for a charity bracelet sold on the Internet 
because it did not contain a picture of the item on which the mark was 
used.139  Although the PTO disclaimed any intent to create a rigid rule 
requiring a picture, the Federal Circuit rejected the PTO’s contention, 
finding that the PTO intended exactly what it disclaimed.140  The Federal 
Circuit then rejected the PTO’s rule and remanded with instructions to 
the PTO to “consider the evidence as a whole to determine” whether the 
specimen of use was sufficient.141  As in Bose, an easily administered 
rule was rejected in favor of a more complicated approach. 
V. TACKING AND PRIORITY: ONE INDUSTRIES V. JIM O’NEAL
When more than one person uses essentially the same trademark in 
the same area, problems are almost inevitable.  In an infringement suit, 
the winner of the battle for control of the mark is the person who used it 
first.142  Often, however, a trademark owner will want to modernize its 
 134. 15 U.S.C. § 1052(e)(2) (1946). 
 135. Nantucket, 677 F.2d at 97-98. 
 136. Id. at 101. 
 137. See also In re Oppedahl & Larson, LLP, 373 F.3d 1171 (Fed. Cir. 2004) (upholding 
rejection of “patents.com,” but indicating that it would not be appropriate from the PTO to create a 
per se rule ignoring the possibility that a top level domain indicator could enhance a mark’s 
distinctiveness). 
 138. 590 F.3d 1282 (Fed. Cir. 2009). 
 139. The web page used the mark, described the item, and offered it for sale.  Id. at 1283. 
 140. “[T]he office actions, the Board’s opinion, and the PTO’s appeal brief belie counsel’s 
answer.”  Id. at 1284. 
 141. Id. at 1288-89. 
 142. Since late 1989, “use” in this context includes constructive use.  If one files an application 
for registration based on intent to use, and the registration subsequently issues, the registrant is 
deemed to have used the mark throughout the United States since the date of the application.  
Lanham Act § 7(c), 15 U.S.C. § 1057(c).  The concept of use analogous to trademark use also 
sometimes backdates priority before actual use.  See T.A.B. Sys. v. Pactel Teletrac, 77 F.3d 1372, 
1375 (Fed. Cir. 1996). 
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mark, by either using a different typeface, altering a logo, or, perhaps, 
slightly altering the actual words used in the mark.  But when the mark 
is altered, does the mark owner lose the priority it had in the original 
mark vis-à-vis users who began using after the original mark was in use 
but before the restyled mark was used?  The answer is two-fold:  if the 
restyled mark is perceived by the public as essentially the same as the 
old mark, then the trademark owner can “tack” the priority of the old 
mark onto the new mark.143  Otherwise, the original priority is lost, and 
the restyled mark will have priority only based on when it was first 
used.144  The key question is:  How much change will be permitted 
before a mark loses its ability to tack?  The Ninth Circuit addressed that 
question in One Industries, LLC v. Jim O’Neal Distributing, Inc.145
O’Neal and One Industries both sold apparel and accessories to off-
road motorcyclists.146  O’Neal, the earlier entrant in the market, used 
“O’” (O apostrophe) as its mark.147  One Industries used a stylized logo 
consisting of interlocking “ones,” which resembled the letter “O.”148  As 
the first user, O’Neal would expect to have priority.149  However, the 
look of the “O’” mark had changed a few times over the years.150  Most 
critically in this case, it had changed between the time One first used its 
logo and the first use of the most recent iteration of the O’Neal “O’” 
mark.151  Because the most recent version was the closest in appearance 
to the One logo (and therefore the most likely to be confused), O’Neal’s 
ability to tack the later mark onto the prior one was very important.152
The proper standard for tacking was crucial.  Here, the court 
reiterated the standard it enunciated a decade earlier: that “[t]he standard 
for ‘tacking’ . . . is exceedingly strict:  [t]he marks must create the same, 
continuing commercial impression and the later mark should not 
 143. See Brookfield Commc’ns, Inc. v. W. Coast Entm’t Corp., 174 F.3d 1036, 1048-49 (9th 
Cir. 1999). 
 144. Id.
 145. 578 F.3d 1154 (9th Cir. 2009). 
 146. Id. at 1156-57. 
 147. Id.
 148. Id.
 149. Id.  Obviously, its priority only mattered to the extent that consumers would be confused 
by the two marks. 
 150. Id.
 151. Id. at 1157-58. 
 152. Id.  O’Neal was the defendant in the case because One Industries filed a declaratory 
judgment action seeking a judgment of non-infringement.  Id. at 1157. O’Neal then counterclaimed 
for infringement.  Id.  Thus, if O’Neal had priority, confusion would result in a successful 
counterclaim for O’Neal.  If O’Neal did not have priority, then confusion would be measured 
against the earlier version of the mark, which proved to be insufficiently similar for confusion. 
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materially differ from or alter the character of [the earlier version].”153
Citing several cases from within and without the Ninth Circuit, the court 
upheld the district court’s determination that tacking was not permissible 
here.154  The logical conclusion is that one should not assume that one’s 
view of the effect of restyling will be the court’s view; indeed, one 
should view the restyling with a very critical eye.  The “exceedingly 
strict” standard means that one must approach the effort carefully, 
perhaps preceded by a thorough trademark search to minimize the risk of 
losing priority.155
A procedural matter provided an interesting side issue in the case.  
One Industries moved for a more definite statement (of the 
counterclaim) under Rule 12(e), a motion that is not normally favored 
under the federal notice pleading and broad discovery regime.156
However, the district court not only granted the motion, but, in doing so, 
it decided the issue of tacking as a matter of law.157  Although deciding 
such an issue on a motion for a more definite statement appears 
irregular, the Ninth Circuit chose not to disturb the district court’s 
conclusion.158
VI. RIGHTS OF PUBLICITY—COMMERCIAL USE OF IDENTITY: YEAGER 
V. CINGULAR WIRELESS
Rights of publicity have long tested the boundaries of commercial 
versus cultural uses of a celebrity’s identity.  A recent district court 
decision, Yeager v. Cingular Wireless LLC,159 provides a good example 
of this tension. 
Cingular ran an advertisement touting the speed of its cellular 
phone system in which it compared its new system to the 
groundbreaking flight of Chuck Yeager breaking the sound barrier.160
 153. Id. at 1160, (citing Brookfield Commc’ns, Inc. v. W. Coast Entm’t Corp., 174 F.3d 1036, 
1048 (9th Cir. 1999)). 
 154. Id. at 1161.  Interestingly, the court conceded that it was “a close case,” but still upheld 
the finding that as a matter of law the mark did not meet the standard.  Id. (emphasis added). 
 155. See, e.g., Quiksilver, Inc. v. Kymsta Corp., 466 F.3d 749, 758 (9th Cir. 2006). 
 156. One Industries, 578 F.3d at 1160. 
 157. Id.
 158. The Ninth Circuit questioned the appropriateness of deciding the issue that way, and 
admonished courts to avoid it, but found no reversible error because O’Neal had notice of the issue 
and chose neither to object nor request that it be put off until after discovery.  Id.  The affirmation in 
light of this issue drew a dissent.  Id. at 1166-67 (Graber, J., concurring in part and dissenting in 
part). 
 159. 673 F. Supp. 2d 1089 (E.D. Cal. 2009). 
 160. Id. at 1094. 
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Yeager sued, claiming both state law and Lanham Act (false 
endorsement) violations.161  Cingular contended that its use did not 
constitute commercial speech, citing the Ninth Circuit's opinion in 
Hoffman v. Capital Cities/ABC, Inc.,162 in which altered versions of 
various famous movie scenes and posters accompanied an article on 
modern fashions.163  The article mentioned the fashion designers, where 
one could buy the various fashions and accessories depicted, and the 
prices.164  The Ninth Circuit held that this was not commercial speech.165
In Yeager, the District Court distinguished Hoffman and held that 
the use in question was commercial speech.166  It noted that Hoffman
involved a feature article (despite its commercial overtones) and noted 
that the magazine in that case was not paid to promote the products.167
Cingular, by contrast, used Yeager’s name in an actual advertisement, 
even if not in a way that made his identity the centerpiece of the 
commercial message.168  The court’s decision was not altogether 
surprising; several years earlier basketball legend Kareem Abdul-Jabbar 
successfully sued General Motors over an advertisement that singled out 
his achievement as a college player (then known as Lew Alcindor).169
Moreover, the more recent decision in Facenda v. NFL Films, Inc.,170
where plaintiff, the estate of the longtime voice of NFL Films, sued 
when his voice was used briefly in a “documentary” about the making of 
the “Madden NFL ’06” video game, also took a commercial viewpoint 
over a non-commercial one.171  Together, Yeager and Facenda indicate 
that it is dangerous to use any identifying characteristic of a celebrity in 
an advertisement, even if the use is arguably incidental or informational. 
 161. Id.
 162. 255 F.3d 1180, 1183 (9th Cir. 2001). 
 163. Id. Dustin Hoffman complained that a movie poster for Tootsie, in which he often 
appeared dressed as a woman, had been altered to show him in a different dress than the one in the 
original poster. 
 164. Id. at 1183-85. 
 165. Id. at 1186. 
 166. Yeager v. Cingular Wireless, LLC, 673 F. Supp. 2d 1089, 1097 (E.D. Cal. 2009). 
 167. Id. at 1098. 
 168. Id. at 1093.  The court denied defendant’s motion for summary judgment on the false 
endorsement claim on the grounds that an issue of fact existed as to its nominative use defense.  Id.
at 1103-1104. 
 169. Abdul-Jabbar v. Gen. Motors Corp., 85 F.3d 407 (9th Cir. 1996). 
 170. 542 F.3d 1007 (3d Cir. 2008). 
 171. Id. at 1016-18.  The court analogized it to an “infomercial.”  Id. at 1017.   See also Dryer 
v. National Football League, 689 F. Supp. 2d 1113 (D. Minn. 2010) (denying defendant’s motion 
for judgment on the pleadings in case alleging use of plaintiff’s image in promotional videos for the 
NFL). 
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VII. OUTSIDE THE BOX—PLEADING: IQBAL
Although the case arose in a context far afield of intellectual 
property, I would feel remiss if I did not offer brief comments on the 
effect of the Supreme Court’s 2009 decision in Ashcroft v. Iqbal.172
Iqbal solidified and extended the Court's 2007 opinion in Bell Atlantic 
Corporation v. Twombly,173 in which the Court enunciated a standard for 
federal pleading—“plausibility”—that has changed the landscape of 
federal practice.  Many observers thought (or hoped) that Twombly
would be a sui generis opinion, born of the particular requirements for 
demonstrating an antitrust violation.174 Iqbal made it clear that all 
pleadings now would be subject to the plausibility standard.175  The 
Court also set forth a two-step process for evaluating pleadings:  (1) 
eliminate the “legal conclusions” in the complaint; and (2) review the 
remaining allegations to determine whether they form a plausible basis 
for a claim.176  What are those legal conclusions that the Court directs us 
to ignore?  One prime source is evidently pleadings that simply track the 
elements of a statute.177
Iqbal arose in a civil rights context, where the plaintiff often lacks 
access to the facts about the defendant's intent, making compliance with 
the plausibility standard difficult.178  How would the standard apply in a 
trademark context?  The key issue is to avoid a pleading that simply 
tracks the language of the Lanham Act.179  In an ordinary infringement 
context, this probably is not difficult.  If there is a registration, for 
example, plead that, together with the basic facts of the defendant’s 
conduct, and that most likely would suffice to allow a plausible 
conclusion of likelihood of confusion.  On its face, a pleading that 
contains a comparison of the plaintiff's mark to a device used by the 
defendant would probably permit the court to make a reasoned judgment 
about whether a confusion claim is plausible.  Dilution, however, is 
more problematic.  Many complaints baldly assert that the plaintiff’s 
 172. 129 S. Ct. 1937 (2009). 
 173. 550 U.S. 544 (2007). 
 174. See, e.g., John P. Sullivan, Twombly and Iqbal:  The Latest Retreat From Notice 
Pleading, 43 SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 1, 41-42 (2009). 
 175. Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. at 1949. 
 176. Id. at 1949-50.  Those familiar with copyright may recognize the similarities between this 
process and a process   used to test substantial similarity in some copyright infringement cases.  See
Computer Assoc. Int’l, Inc. v. Altai, Inc., 982 F.2d 693 (2d Cir. 1992). 
 177. Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. at 1949-50. 
 178. Id.. at 1939. 
 179. See infra note 7. 
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mark is “famous,” without pleading supporting facts.180  Such assertions 
(although arguably fame is a combination of fact and law) may not pass 
muster under Iqbal.181  Moreover, the conclusory allegation that the 
defendant's use of a mark is likely to cause dilution could pose 
additional problems.  A court, using its “judicial experience and 
common sense,”182 could infer that confusion is plausible from a bare 
demonstration of trademark rights and a short statement of defendant's 
conduct.  But dilution is more amorphous, and plausibly inferring 
dilution from anything short of an identical or near-identical use of a 
famous mark183 might be difficult.  Nevertheless, district courts probably 
will allow fairly conclusory allegations to pass muster until they receive 
more guidance from the courts of appeals. 
 180. See, e.g., VMM Ent., Inc. v. Welch, No. 8:07-cv-1380-T-23TBM,  2007 WL 3202450 
(M.D. Fla. Oct. 26, 2007).  Cf. Vulcan Golf, LLC v. Google, Inc., 552 F. Supp. 2d 752 (N.D. Ill. 
2008). 
 181. See Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. at 1949. 
 182. Id. at 1950. 
 183. See Thane Int’l, Inc. v. Trek Bicycle Corp., 305 F.3d 894, 907 (9th Cir. 2002). 
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